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DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Court of Appeals jurisdiction: Motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence will not preserve reviewable question of law on lack of
corroboration
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in noncapital criminal
cases is limited by the state constitution to review of questions of
law.210 To preserve a challenge for Court of Appeals review, there-
fore, the CPL requires in most cases that a litigant register an ef-
fective protest to a disputed ruling or instruction in the court of
original jurisdiction.21' The statute further provides that any
meaningful complaint sufficient to apprise the trial court of a
party's position with respect to the ruling or instruction will con-
stitute an effective protest even if it is imprecisely or inartistically
phrased. 2 Recently, however, in People v. Cona,213 the Court of
211 See N.Y. CONST. art. 4, § 3(a); People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 394 N.E.2d 1134,
1135, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (1979); People v. Mackell, 40 N.Y.2d 59, 67, 351 N.E.2d 684,
689, 386 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41-42 (1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting). In contrast to the limited appel-
late jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the appellate divisions have the plenary power to
consider and determine questions of law or to reverse or modify on the facts or in the exer-
cise of discretion. CPL § 470.15(3) (1971); see People v. Coppa, 45 N.Y.2d 244, 380 N.E.2d
195, 408 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1978); People v. Monroe, 40 N.Y.2d 1096, 360 N.E.2d 1076, 392
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1977); 6 J. Z'rr, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE I 53.5[3][a] (1977 & Supp.
1979).
211 See People v. Cona, 49 N.Y.2d 26, 33, 399 N.E.2d 1167, 1168-69, 424 N.Y.S.2d 146,
148-49 (1979); CPL § 470.05 (1971). The preservation requirements of § 470.05 may be en-
tirely dispensed with in certain narrowly circumscribed instances. Thus, a fundamental
right, a constitutional right, or a trial error touching the elemental jurisdiction of the crimi-
nal courts may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d
1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979) (double jeopardy); People v. Patterson, 39
N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976), af'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (certain
jurisdictional defects); People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801
(1972) (right to counsel).
For a discussion of the distinctions among the concepts of reviewability, appealability,
waiver, and "law of the case," see People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 5 n.1, 394 N.E.2d 1134,
1135 n.1, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 n.1 (1979) (per curiam); People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589,
600, 384 N.E.2d 656, 663-64, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 117 (1978); People v. Watson, 57 App. Div.
2d 143, 146, 393 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (2d Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382
N.E.2d 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1977); Karger, The New York Court of Appeals: Some As-
pects of the Limitations on Its Jurisdiction, 27 REC. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 370, 377-79 (1972).
212 CPL § 470.05 (1971). Any protest of error, regardless of its phraseology, is sufficient
to preserve a challenge for appellate consideration. See id.; 6 J. ZErw, NEW YORK CRIMINAL
PRACTICE § 53.5[1] (1977 & Supp. 1979); STAFF COMMENTS TO THE PROPOSED CPL § 240.10
(1967). Nevertheless, the statute requires a certain degree of specificity in objections in or-
der to eliminate the need for a new trial where a proper and timely objection would have
alerted the court to the disputed issue at the first trial. People v. Vidal, 26 N.Y.2d 249, 254,
257 N.E.2d 886, 889-90, 309 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (1970). Thus, an objection is sufficient to
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Appeals held that a timely motion to dismiss for insufficient evi-
dence did not satisfy the statutory requirement so as to allow the
Court to reach the merits of the defendants' claim that they had
been convicted on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testi-
mony.2 14
In Cona, 24 defendants, all of whom had been members of the
New York City Police Department, were indicted on charges of
conspiring to solicit and collect payoffs from gamblers in exchange
for "protection" from police interference in their gambling activi-
ties.215 At trial, 11 of the defendants were implicated in the scheme
solely by the testimony of two former co-conspirators, Officers
Buchalski and O'Brien.16 On the stand, the officers related events
preserve a question for appellate review only if the attention of the court and the adversary
is "fairly and distinctly called to the precise error complained of." Henze v. People, 82 N.Y.
611, 613 (1880); see People v. Smith, 172 App. Div. 826, 833, 159 N.Y.S. 1073, 1078 (1916);
cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-91 (1977) (contemporaneous-objection rule discour-
ages "sandbagging" by defense attorneys and elicits defendants' constitutional claims when
recollections of witnesses are freshest); Pobliner v. Fogg, 438 F. Supp. 890, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (failure of habeas corpus petitioner to object contemporaneously to admission of alleg-
edly tainted evidence deprived prosecution of opportunity to prove independent untainted
sources for the information). Notably, even under the former Code of Criminal Procedure,
which imposed a stricter standard for the sufficiency of objections, a general objection would
suffice to preserve an issue for appeal if raised in such a context that, had it been specific, it
would have been dispositive of the argument. People v. Vidal, 26 N.Y.2d 249, 254, 257
N.E.2d 886, 889-90, 309 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (1970); People v. Morrison, 194 N.Y. 175, 86 N.E.
1120 (1909); Tooley v. Bacon, 70 N.Y. 34, 8 Hun. 176 (1877); People v. Smith, 172 App. Div.
826, 159 N.Y.S. 1073 (1916).
2.3 49 N.Y.2d 26, 399 N.E.2d 1167, 424 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1979) aff'g in part, rev'g in part,
60 App. Div. 2d 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1978).
214 Id. at 33 n.2, 399 N.E.2d at 1169 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.2. Section 60.22 of the
CPL precludes a conviction based on the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony
is corroborated by nonaccomplice evidence tending to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the crime charged. CPL § 60.22(1) (1971). The accomplice doctrine reflects a
legislative determination that the complicity of a witness in the alleged offense renders his
testimony inherently suspect. People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74, 385 N.E.2d 572, 412
N.Y.S.2d 833 (1978). The corroboration of accomplice testimony was not required at com-
mon law, however, see In re Hardenbrook, 135 App. Div. 634, 121 N.Y.S. 250, afl'd, 199 N.Y.
539, 92 N.E. 1086 (1909), nor is it currently required in the federal courts, see United States
v. Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 685 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978), where the status of
a witness as an accomplice is merely deemed to be one factor bearing upon the credibility of
his testimony, United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1978).
210 49 N.Y.2d at 32, 399 N.E.2d at 1168, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148. Specifically, each defen-
dant was indicted on one count of bribe receiving, one count of receiving an award for offi-
cial misconduct, two counts of conspiracy, and one count of official misconduct. Id. They
allegedly operated a highly organized network for receiving bribes from gamblers within the
geographical confines of the 13th Plainclothes Division. Id. at 38, 399 N.E.2d at 1172, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 152 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
210 49 N.Y.2d at 32-34, 399 N.E.2d at 1168-70, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49. Buchalski had
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:788
and observations occurring both during the time of their actual
participation in the bribery scheme and during a period in which
they were acting as undercover operatives.217 At the close of the
People's case, defense counsel made a motion on behalf of all the
defendants to dismiss the indictment on the ground of insufficient
evidence."1 ' Additionally, two defendants moved to dismiss the
charges due to lack of corroboration of the accomplice testi-
mony.21 9 At the end of the trial, the defendants inculpated by
O'Brien's testimony requested a jury charge that the officer was an
accomplice as a matter of law and that, therefore, his entire testi-
mony was subject to the corroboration requirement.2 20 These pro-
tests were unsuccessful, and all 11 defendants were subsequently
convicted.22" ' The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed
the convictions and dismissed the indictment, however, concluding
that Buchalski and O'Brien were "accomplices" when acting as in-
formants, as well as when they were actual co-conspirators, and
that their testimony as to the events transpiring while they were
undercover agents could not provide the necessary corroboration
for their conspiratorial testimony.22
2
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals agreed with the appel-
agreed to operate as an undercover agent for the authorities in their investigation of the
operation in return for immunity from prosecution for his prior criminal involvement. Id. at
32, 399 N.E.2d at 1168, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148. O'Brien, on the other hand, initially infiltrated
the conspiracy in an undercover capacity, but subsequently became an active and actual
participant in the scheme. Id. at 34, 399 N.E.2d at 1169, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
2 7 Id. at 32, 399 N.E.2d at 1168, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 147. In addition to oral testimony,
tape recordings of conversations elicited from 10 defendants were admitted into evidence.
Two defendants identified the voices on the tapes as theirs, but disputed the incriminatory
interpretation given by the prosecution. 60 App. Div. 2d at 325. As to the other defendants,
however, the only authentication of the recordings was given by Officer Buchalski himself.
Id. at 323, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
218 49 N.Y.2d at 33 n.2, 399 N.E.2d at 1169 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.2.
219 Id. at 37 n.3, 399 N.E.2d at 1171 n.3, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 151 n.3.
220 Id. at 34, 399 N.E.2d at 1170, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 149. The trial court charged the jury
that the officers were accomplices as a matter of law during the time they were actual par-
ticipants in the conspiracy. Id. As to the periods during which they were operating as under-
cover agents, the court instructed that it was a question of fact for the jury to determine
whether they were accomplices. 60 App. Div. 2d at 327, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 244; id. at 333, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 249 (Rabin, J., dissenting).
221 60 App. Div. 2d at 320, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
222 Id. at 323-25, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 242-44 (2d Dep't 1978). On appeal to the appellate
division, eight of the original defendants were not parties, and one of the defendant-appel-
lants died after the institution of the appeal. Id. at 320, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The convic-
tions of four of the appellants were affirmed on the ground that there existed sufficient
nonaccomplice testimony to corroborate the testimony of the officers. Id. at 325-26, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 244.
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late division's resolution on the merits, finding "no justification for
distinguishing between testimony pertaining to different periods of
time as a basis for application of the accomplice corroboration
rule. 223 Writing for the majority, 224 Judge Gabrielli concluded that
by timely requesting a charge that O'Brien was an accomplice as a
matter of law, two of the defendants had created a question of law
amenable to Court of Appeals review.225 Moreover, the majority
stated, the interposition by two other defendants of a motion to
dismiss specifically alleging lack of corroboration rendered their
claims reviewable as well. Accordingly, the appellate division order
reversing the convictions of all of these defendants was affirmed.226
The Court reinstated the convictions of the seven remaining defen-
dants, however, ruling that by failing to object to that portion of
the trial court's charge dealing with the accomplice corroboration
requirement, they had failed to preserve the question for Court of
223 49 N.Y.2d at 35, 399 N.E.2d at 1170, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The majority relied upon
"the plain language of the law" in finding that Officer O'Brien was an accomplice during all
the events and transactions he related at trial. Id. Since the accomplice corroboration stat-
ute includes within its ambit witnesses who have participated in "[a]n offense based upon
the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged," CPL §
60.22(2)(b) (1971), Judge Gabrielli concluded that O'Brien's entire testimony, including that
portion relating to events occurring before his involvement in the scheme, was subject to the
corroboration requirement. 49 N.Y.2d at 35, 399 N.E.2d at 1170, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
The Cona Court's resolution of the corroboration issue seems unexceptional in light of
the letter and spirit of the corroboration statute. The enactment of the CPL in 1971 relaxed
the degree of complicity necessary to invoke the corroboration rule. See CPL § 60.22, com-
mentary at 194-95 (1971). Under § 399 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, "accom-
plice" included only those persons who could have been convicted at trial as a principal or
accessory before the fact. Id. Professor Denzer notes, however, that the statute as presently
drawn is sufficiently broad to cover persons "who are in some way criminally implicated in,
and possibly subject to prosecution for, the general conduct or factual transaction on trial."
Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, a witness will be deemed an accomplice for purposes of the
statutory corroboration requirement even if his involvement in the alleged offense is merely
reciprocal or correlative. See People v. Jackson, 69 Misc. 2d 793, 797, 331 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1972); CPL § 60.22, commentary at 194-95 (1971). The
Court's decision in Cona, therefore, appears to comport with the intent of the legislature to
apply liberally the requirement of independent corroborative evidence.
224 Judges Jones, Fuchsberg, and Meyer joined Judge Gabrielli in the majority. Judge
Jasen dissented in part and voted to modify in a separate opinion. Filing a separate memo-
randum in which Chief Judge Cooke concurred, Judge Wachtler dissented in part and voted
to modify the appellate division order.
225 49 N.Y.2d at 34, 399 N.E.2d at 1170, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
226 Id. at 37 & n.3, 399 N.E.2d at 1171 & n.3, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 151 & n.3. The specific
ground cited by the Court for affirming the portion of the order relating to these defendants
was "insufficient evidence in the record to corroborate the accomplice testimony implicating
[them]." Id. at 37, 399 N.E.2d at 1171, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
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Appeals review.22" Although acknowledging that a timely motion to
dismiss had been made on behalf of all the defendants, the Court
stated that there was no indication in the record that the motion
was predicated on a claim that corroboration was lacking.228 Hence,
Judge Gabrielli concluded, the remaining defendants were pre-
cluded from relying on the motion to "creat[e] a question of law on
this point. '229 Instead, the majority remitted the case in order to
allow the lower court the opportunity to exercise its discretionary
power to review alleged errors to which no timely objection had
been made at trial.23 °
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Jasen disputed the majority's res-
olution of the reviewability issue.131 Judge Jasen argued that all
... Id. at 33-34, 399 N.E.2d at 1169, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49; see note 210 supra.
228 Id. at 33 n.2, 399 N.E.2d at 1169 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.2.
229 Id.
230 Id.; see notes 210-11 and accompanying text supra. To guard against the possibility
that the Court of Appeals might review an appellate division order reversing in the exercise
of discretion or on the weight of the evidence, the Court has developed the practice of re-
quiring the order to recite the precise basis of the lower court's decision. People v. Mackell,
40 N.Y.2d 59, 67, 351 N.E.2d 684, 689, 386 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41-42 (1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
In deciding whether its jurisdictional requisites have been met, however, the Court is em-
powered to look beyond a recital in the order that the appellate division's reversal was "on
the law." Thus, if it determines that a facially appealable order was partially "on the facts"
or "in the interests of justice," the Court may divest itself of jurisdiction to review the
question. People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 937, 938, 280 N.E.2d 98, 99, 329 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326
(1972); People v. Woodruff, 27 N.Y.2d 801, 802, 264 N.E.2d 353, 353, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861, 861
(1970). A contrary rule applied, however, if the order was facially unreviewable. If the order
recited that the appellate division's decison was "on the facts" or "in the interest of justice,"
it was conclusively unreviewable; the Court could not look beyond the recital in the order,
and the appeal had to be dismissed. See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 937, 938, 280
N.E.2d 98, 99, 329 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (1972); People v. Cooper, 25 N.Y.2d 928, 928-29, 252
N.E.2d 626, 626, 305 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1969); People v. Campbell, 25 N.Y.2d 784, 784-85,
250 N.E.2d 586, 586, 303 N.Y.S.2d 530, 530 (1969). Prompted by the patent inequity worked
by this rule in People v. Mackell, 40 N.Y.2d 59, 351 N.E.2d 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976), the
legislature responded with a 1980 amendment to CPL § 450.90 (1971 & Supp. 1979-1980).
See CPL § 450.90, commentary at 100-01 (Supp. 1979-1980). Pursuant to the statute as
amended, the Court of Appeals may review an order if it "determines that the intermediate
appellate court's determination was ...upon the law and such facts which, but for the
determination of law, would not have led to reversal or modification." CPL § 450.90(2)(b)
(Supp. 1979-1980).
231 49 N.Y.2d at 45-46, 399 N.E.2d at 1176-77, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Jasen, J., dissent-
ing). In addition to criticizing the Court's resolution of the reviewability issue, the dissent
also characterized the majority's disposition on the merits as a "restrictive, if not oppressive,
construction of the statutory corroboration rule" that would "effectively and permanently
deprive law enforcement of ... the use of the turncoat conspirator." Id. at 37-38, 399
N.E.2d at 1171-72, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (Jasen J., dissenting). Although he acknowledged
that the term "accomplice" for purposes of the corroboration requirement had been ex-
panded by the enactment of the CPL, id. at 41, 399 N.E.2d at 1173-74, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 153
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the defendants had preserved "the pure question of law'' 3 2 of suf-
ficiency of the corroborative evidence by moving to dismiss at the
close of the People's case.2 3 Although the stated ground for the
motion was the prosecution's failure to establish a prima facie case
against the defendants,23 4 the dissent urged that the supporting ar-
guments of counsel and the trial judge's ruling demonstrated that
the major issue raised by the motion was that of corroboration.23 5
Moreover, since the appellate division had "specifically" predi-
cated its reversal on a finding of legally insufficient evidence, Judge
Jasen asserted, the issue was amenable to Court of Appeals re-
view.2 38 Finally, the dissent postulated that the Court's disposition
of the case by remittitur gave rise to the "foregone conclusion"
that the appellate division would conform its order to the legal
conclusions reached by the majority.2 37
It is submitted that the determination by the Cona court that
it lacked jurisdiction to review the defendants' corroboration claim
was inconsistent both with judicial precedent and statutory rules
of appellate procedure.238 Indeed, although the defendants' protest
(Jasen, J., dissenting), Judge Jasen urged that § 60.22 had never dispensed with the require-
ment that the witness be criminally implicated in the transactions related at trial. Id.
(Jasen, J., dissenting). Reasoning that criminal liability depended on the presence of the
requisite criminal intent, the dissent concluded that an undercover officer, whose participa-
tion is merely feigned, could not be "criminally implicated" in the conduct involved. Id.
(Jasen, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Jasen suggested that the testimony proffered by
such a witness need not suffer from the unreliability normally attributed to accomplice tes-
timony; he has been offered immunity from prosecution and so has no motive to exculpate
himself at the expense of the conspirators on trial. Id. at 42, 399 N.E.2d at 1174, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 154 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 45, 399 N.E.2d at 1176, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
11- Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
234 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
23, Id. at 46, 399 N.E.2d at 1176-77, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
In his separate opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke concurred, Judge Wachtler agreed
with the majority on the reviewability issue, but concurred with Judge Jasen on the merits
of the appellants' claim. Id. at 46, 399 N.E.2d at 1177, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 157 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
13 Id. at 46, 399 N.E.2d at 1177, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
'3 The Cona court refused to distinguish between an exception directed at the trial
court's charge and a protest based on legally insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals has
distinguished, however, between alleged charge errors and claims of evidentiary insufficiency
in the past. See, e.g., People v. Speigel, 48 N.Y.2d 647, 648, 396 N.E.2d 472, 472, 421
N.Y.S.2d 190, 190 (1979); People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 631 n.4, 339 N.E.2d 139, 143 n.4,
376 N.Y.S.2d 436, 442 n.4 (1975). In Spiegel, which was cited with approval in Cona, the
defendant had asserted on appeal to the appellate division the failure of the trial court to
1980]
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may have been ineffective to preserve the charge point for appel-
late review,239 the majority's conclusion that their timely motion to
dismiss for insufficient evidence was inadequate to raise a question
of law on that point seems at odds with the relaxed preservation
requirement of the CPL.24 0 According to the statute, "a party who
without success has expressly or impliedly sought or requested a
particular ruling . . . is thereby deemed to have protested the
court's ultimate disposition of the matter. . sufficiently to raise a
question of law. . . If, as Judge Jasen has suggested, the col-
loquy between the court and defense counsel had crystallized cor-
roboration as the dispositive issue,242 the motion to dismiss would
appear to have sufficiently preserved that question for Court of
Appeals review.
Moreover, that the appellate division order was based on an
erroneous determination of the reviewability of the charge point 243
does not preclude the Court of Appeals from reaching the merits of
the distinct legal contention of insufficient evidence. The CPL pro-
vides that, upon receiving an order from an intermediate appellate
court, the Court of Appeals may consider any other properly pre-
served question of law, although that issue did not constitute a ba-
sis for the appellate division's reversal. 44 Furthermore, "even
though rejecting the intermediate appellate court's reasons for its
order of reversal," the Court "may affirm or modify such order
charge the accomplice rule. Because he had failed to register an effective protest at trial,
however, the appellate division held that reversal was not warranted as a matter of law. Id.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defendant alternatively contended that "the proof at
trial [was] legally insufficient to sustain the conviction." Id. The failure of the defendant to
except to the charge did not preclude the Court from reviewing this distinct legal defect,
and the Court subsequently reached the merits of his claim. Id. at 648-49, 396 N.E.2d at
472, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 190; cf. People v. Robinson, 36 N.Y.2d 224, 229, 326 N.E.2d 784, 786-
87, 367 N.Y.S.2d 208, 212 (1975) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (even in absence of exception to
charge, principle that prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is sufficiently
fundamental to create reviewable question of law).
239 See People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 631 n.4, 339 N.E.2d 139, 143 n.4, 376 N.Y.S.2d
436, 442 n.4 (1975).
240 See id.; People v. Thomas, 36 N.Y.2d 514, 516, 330 N.E.2d 609, 610-11, 369 N.Y.S.2d
645, 647-48 (1975). One commentator has suggested that even a motion to dismiss made at
the close of all the proof, rather than at the close of the People's case, should be adequate to
preserve for review the issue of the legal sufficiency of evidence. See R. PrrLER, NEW YORK
CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL § 14.40 (Supp. 1979).
24" CPL § 470.05(2) (1971).
242 See text accompanying note 235 supra.
242 See note 227 and accompanying text supra.
24 CPL § 470.35(2)(b) (1971).
[Vol. 54:788
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upon the basis of such other questions .... In this manner,
the Cona Court could have expeditiously determined the merit of
the defendants' contentions without the necessity for remittitur to
the appellate division." 6
The Cona decision seems to portend a stricter preservation re-
quirement in New York appellate practice. It appears that an im-
precisely phrased objection or motion, once overruled or denied,
will no longer suffice to preserve a question of law unless the pro-
test is reregistered by a more specific objection or by an exception
to the jury charge. As a result of Cona, therefore, defendants may
be unduly penalized for what is, at most, imprecise trial advocacy
215 Section 470.35(2)(b), in its entirety, permits the Court of Appeals to consider and
determine:
Any other question of law involving alleged or possible error or defect in the
criminal court proceedings resulting in the original judgment, sentence or order
which may have adversely affected the party who was appellant in the intermedi-
ate appellate court and who is respondent in the court of appeals. The court of
appeals is not precluded from considering or determining such a question by the
circumstance that it was not considered or determined by the intermediate appel-
late court, or that it did not constitute a basis for such court's reversal or modifi-
cation, or that the party who may have been adversely affected thereby is the
respondent rather than the appellant in the court of appeals; and the court of
appeals, even though rejecting the intermediate appellate court's reasons for its
order of reversal or modification, may affirm or modify such order upon the basis
of such other questions ....
CPL § 470.35(2)(b) (1971). Professor Denzer's commentary is particularly illustrative of the
sort of situation contemplated by § 470.35(2)(b):
Upon an appeal to the Appellate Division from a judgment of conviction, the
defendant-appellant raises legal contentions A, B and C, all addressed to alleged
trial errors. Sustaining his position upon contention A, the Appellate Division
reverses the judgment, declaring that under the circumstances it is unnecessary to
consider contentions B and C.
Upon an appeal by the People to the Court of Appeals (based, of course, upon
the claim that the Appellate Division was wrong with respect to contention A), the
defendant, who is now the respondent, in addition to urging the correctness of the
Appellate Division's decision, seeks to argue that, even were the Court of Appeals
to disagree with it, the alleged errors presented in contentions B and C (not deter-
mined by the Appellate Division) justify a reversal of the judgment.
CPL § 470.35, commentary at 635 (1971).
248 Again, Professor Denzer indicates that subdivision 2(b) may indeed be adaptable to
the Cona situation:
The rule [of § 470.35(2)(b)] is patently an equitable one. It would hardly be fair to
deprive the defendant of all appellate consideration of contentions B and C be-
cause of the Appellate Division's error in handling the case. The only just alterna-
tive would be remission of the case to the Appellate Division for determination of
contentions B and C - a cumbersome and seemingly pointless procedure in view
of the fact that the Court of Appeals has in effect already decided those issues.
CPL § 470.35(2)(b), commentary at 635-36 (1971).
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by making the appellate divisions their courts of last resort.
Elaine T. Ryan
Third party consent to warrantless police search of jointly occu-
pied premises valid notwithstanding contemporaneous objection
of co-occupant.
The fourth amendment 2 7 prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures generally requires that government officials
obtain a valid warrant prior to conducting a search.24 The need for
a warrant is obviated, however, if valid consent 249 to the search is
24. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
248 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
643-60 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914); 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.1, at 438-39 (1978); Comment, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1056, 1057 (1977).
Warrantless searches are deemed unreasonable per se, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (citing Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)), unless they are predicated on one of the estab-
lished exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
509-10 (1978) (exigency); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (border
searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-76 (1976) (inventory search of au-
tomobile); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974) (consent); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (search incident to traffic arrest); Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973) (dangerous weapon); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465-71 (1971) (open view); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970) (automo-
bile); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest);
People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 592-93, 408 N.E.2d 908, 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 585 (1980)
(abandonment); People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 209-10, 306 N.E.2d 777, 780, 351 N.Y.S.2d
649, 653-54 (1973) (airport searches); cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (no
scene-of-crime exception). Evidence seized as a result of an illegal search will be suppressed
pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
1'9 In order to be valid, consent to a warrantless search must be made voluntarily. See,
e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Whether consent is voluntary "is
a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227.
Some of the factors to be considered in determining the voluntary nature of a defendant's
consent include:
the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of
any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punish-
ment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.
Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
Consent has been rendered involuntary by the presence of a disproportionate number
of police in relation to the number of defendants, People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 124,
